‘Chain’ beats ‘Triangle’

chain-beats-triangleFollowers of ‘Modern’ (?) management find themselves in essentially the same position: Trying to increase value1 to their investors. But, if this is their outlook, where to start?

Introducing the Triangle

Perhaps the place where ‘the triangle’ is seen most visibly is within many a traditional project management book – you will likely see a lovely little diagram within its first few foundational pages, with the words ‘quality’, ‘cost’ and ‘time’ at its points.

triangleIt will go on to suggest that the Project Manager’s job is to juggle these three variables so as to deliver ‘on time, within budget and to an acceptable quality’.

The key thing to notice is the assumption that there is an equation in which these variable are somehow related….and received wisdom goes on to suggest that there is a trade off and ‘we can’t have it all’ e.g. if we want higher quality then this would sacrifice time and/or cost.

…and the thinking behind that triangle isn’t limited to projects…it goes right across the organisation, in everything it does – basically that faster and cheaper are the opposite of higher quality.

All makes sense doesn’t it – nothing to see here. Blog post over?

Well no, as you’ve probably guessed, I’m just revving up!

And so to Dr Deming:

In his book ‘Out of the Crisis’ (1982)Dr W. Edwards Deming wrote about the “folklore…that quality and productivity are incompatible: that you can’t have both. A manager will usually tell you that it is either or. In his experience, if he pushes quality, he falls behind in production. If he pushes production, his quality suffers. This will be his experience when he knows not what quality is nor how to achieve it.”

Deming’s last line suggests that there could be value in exploring:

  • What ‘quality’ means; and
  • His thinking on how to achieve it.

What is quality?

It’s obvious isn’t it? Surely, it’s simply “how good something is!” Well, yes…but that doesn’t get us very far. It poses the rather obvious question “good for who?”

There are two levels to drill into:


Level 1 (and perhaps you’ll all be yawning reading this much-stated point) is that quality is, and can only be, defined by ‘the customer’ (or citizen or patient or….).

It follows that you can’t tell your customers what quality is, or quietly determine this for them. Instead, if you really want to deliver ‘quality’, you’d better spend time constantly understanding2 your customers and what they want/ need from your product/ service/process.


Level 2 is that there is no such thing as the average customer – no two customers are the same – and, as such, quality is defined by each unique customer…and this point has profound implications (particularly for service organisations).

For example, it would be a mistake to create a ‘customer specification’ and think that you have solved the quality conundrum. We need to understand the particular customer before us and design a system that can effectively, and efficiently, absorb their variety. This would be the opposite of trying to force them into a straight jacket.

“You’ve ‘dissed’ the triangle…but what’s your ‘Chain’ got to do with it?”

And so to Deming’s thinking on how to achieve quality. I’ll start by introducing his ‘quality chain reaction’:

Deming wrote that, in the post World War 2 period, some Japanese companies observed that “improvement of quality begets naturally and inevitably improvement of productivity.” i.e. that when quality goes up, costs actually come down. This would seem to be the opposite of our triangle!

How can this be so? Well, when the quality goes up, costs decrease due to fewer mistakes, less rework, fewer delays…reduced failure demand…and on and on. This leads to a continually improving flow.

Deming went on to write that the following “chain reaction was on the blackboard of every meeting within top management in Japan from July 1950 onwards:”

Improve quality – costs decrease – productivity improves – capture market (better quality, lower prices) – stay in business – provide jobs…and more jobs.

Notice where it ends – jobs. Contrast this with where most cost-cutting ‘initiatives’ start – jobs…but not to create them!

Deming calls out a difference in thinking3:

“Western Industry is satisfied to improve quality to a level where visible figures may shed doubt about the economic benefit of further improvement. As someone enquired, ‘how low may we go in quality without losing customers?’ This question packs a mountain of misunderstanding into a few choice words. It is typical of management’s misunderstanding in America.

In contrast, the Japanese go right ahead and improve the process without regard to figures. They thus improve productivity, decrease costs, and capture the market.” (Deming)

‘Triangle’ thinking requires a detailed business case, showing a healthy (yet imaginary) ‘return on investment’ (ROI) before anything can gain authorisation to proceed. This is, unhelpfully, labelled as ‘governance’.

‘Chain reaction’ thinking uses a clear vision, for the customer, and gets on with constantly experimenting towards it, whilst checking the results. This generates a purpose-seeking learning organisation.

Updating the Quality chain

Dan Jones, in one of his YouTube videos, expands Deming’s quality chain reaction to show its wider effect on the full organisational system4. I really liked what he had done on his slide…but I wanted to make it clearer still…and so I ‘tweaked it’ (see below5)…showing that, if you start at quality, the chain reaction is kicked off and then continues to flow around and around the system:

quality-chain-reaction

Now, many a command-and-control organisation would look at the above and shout out “that’s exactly what we are doing!”…and so, to counter this riposte, I thought I’d re-do the diagram but this time start at cost.

i.e. if your starting point is to reduce costs (usually by interrogating line items on the P&L, and focusing on activities) then you are NOT on the quality chain reaction. You would be on quite a different journey:

activity-cost-spiral

In a sentence:

Customer Purpose (which, by definition, means quality) comes first…which then delivers growth and profitability, and NOT the other way around!

…and, for all you executives/ senior managers out there, many (most!) of your people already know this6.

Footnotes

1. The definition of Value: I reflect on a rather nice quote from Jeffrey Liker: “The first question…is always: ‘What does the customer want from this process?’ This defines value.

Unfortunately, the modern corporate world has somewhat twisted this definition, and has come to believe that value is defined by the providers of ‘dead money’.

2. Understanding your customer: This requires much more than simply asking them what they want/ need. They often don’t know or, even if they do, can’t (or won’t) clearly articulate this. We need to listen to, and observe, the demands that they place on the system…and then we can truly understand how they behave.

3. Deming’s ‘Western/ American vs. Japanese’ comparison reflects the age, and focus, that he was operating within. Times have changed – not all Western/ American organisations can be tarred with the same brush…and not all Japanese organisations have stayed true to this thinking.

I suggest a modern interpretation would be to compare how organisations are run, by:

  • Command-and-Control ‘financial engineers’, attempting to use remote-control management; with
  • ‘Systems thinking’ value stream managers

4. Dan Jones presentation: See his slide with the heading ‘defining value’

5. Value for investors: I’ve added employees to the ‘value to investors’ column label within the diagram, to reiterate my recommendation that the system needs ’live moneyto enable this way of thinking.

6. A common aim: The production worker in Japan, as anywhere else in the world, always knew about this chain reaction; also that defects and faults that get into the hands of customers lose the market and cost him his job.

Once management in Japan adopted the chain reaction, everyone there from 1950 onward had one common aim, namely, quality.

With no lenders nor stockbrokers to press for dividends, this effort became an undivided bond between management and production workers.” (Deming)

I know that it’s a broken record but…this last sentence returns back to “Your Money or your Life!”

Slaughtering the ‘Sacred Cow’

moo-cowI’ve written enough posts now to ‘write a book’ 🙂 …so it’s about time I dealt with a seemingly sacred cow – the ‘Balanced Scorecard’.

Context

First, I’ll delve into a bit of history…

Robert Kaplan and David Norton performed a research project back in 1990 in respect of measuring organisational performance.

It was based on the premise that:

  • An organisation’s knowledge-based assets1 were becoming increasingly important;
  • The primary measurement system remained2 the financial accounting system; and
  • Executives and employees pay attention to what they measure and, therefore, were overly focused on the (short term) financials and insufficiently on the (longer term) intangible assets.

balanced-scorecardThe outcome of their research project was the concept of a Balanced Scorecard of measurements (and, of course, the accompanying Harvard Business School (HBS) management book).

This retained the organisation’s financial measures (as historic results) but added three additional perspectives:

  • Customer;
  • Internal Business Processes; and
  • Learning & Growth.

The last two were said to represent the lead indicators of future financial performance.

The Balanced Scorecard quickly gained traction in many corporations. This was helped by many a ‘big consultancy’ cashing in3 on the lucrative ‘implementation’ revenue stream.

Version 2.0

Over a decade later (2004) Kaplan and Norton then took things further by linking strategy formulation and execution to their measurement ideas and came up with the Strategy Map concept (and, you’ve guessed it…an accompanying HBS management book). I imagine that this was for two reasons:

1. They saw some improvements to/ holes in the original idea;

…and with my cynical hat sat jauntily on my head…

2. They now had an adoring following that would buy the sequel which, as ever, sets out:

– the big idea in detail;

– a set of carefully curated case studies; and

– instructions on how to implement ‘the big idea’ in (on?) your organisation

strategy-mapThe ‘Strategy Map’ turned the four quadrants of the balanced scorecard into a linear cause-effect view (see picture)

The idea went that the desired financial outcomes would be stated at the top, which would then be achieved by reverse engineering down the strategy map to the bottom.

Thus, through setting objectives from top down to bottom and using measures, targets and action plans (involving initiatives with business cases and budgets), the desired outcome could be achieved.

Wow, that all looks really cool – neat looking and oh-so-complete! Doesn’t it?

So why the ‘Sacred Cow’ reference?

Well, many (most?) organisations feverishly adopted the Balanced Scorecard/ Strategy Map tools and technique as if it were common sense. Indeed, some 20 years later, it has become ‘part of the management furniture’. Unquestioned…even unquestionable.

However, I believe that there are a number of serious problems within…so let’s consider whether that proverbial sacred cow deserves to be slaughtered…

There are two angles that I could come at it from:

  1. The thinking within the Balanced Scorecard/Strategy Map logic; and
  2. How organisations typically implement these ‘big ideas’.

It would be too easy to shoot at how organisations typically implement them (i.e. how they might have bastardised it4)…and you could easily accuse me of ‘cheap shots’, saying that these aren’t Kaplan and Norton’s fault. So, instead, I’ll critique the foundational logic using four headings.

Here goes…


1. Measurement:

The foundation of Kaplan and Norton’s logic is that we must have measures if we are to manage something…and this is regarded as conventional wisdom…but here’s a counter-quote from W. Edwards Deming to ponder:

“Of course visible figures are important but he that would run his company on visible figures alone will in time have neither company nor figures. The most important figures are unknown and unknowable but successful management must nevertheless take account of them.”

His point is that we seem to be obsessed with trying to measure the effect of a given change (usually to ‘claim it’ for some recognition or even reward), but that we cannot accurately do so…and it is a mistake to think that we can. Sure, we can likely determine whether a change is having a positive or negative effect on the system (and thereby try to amplify or dampen it) but we cannot isolate the change from everything else going on (internally or externally; occurring right now, previously or in the future)

Deming went on to provide some examples of ‘important but unknowable’:

  • The multiplying effect on sales that comes from a happy customer, and the opposite from an unhappy one;
  • The improvement of quality and productivity from teamwork (across the horizontal value stream and with suppliers);
  • The boost in quality and productivity all along a value stream from an improvement at any activity upstream;
  • The loss from the annual rating of people’s performance (the time taken by everyone to perform this process and, of far greater concern, the resulting de-motivation and relational damage caused)
  • …and so on

Deming famously wrote that “it is wrong to suppose that if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it – a costly myth.”

feedback-cartoonExample: Can I manage how employees feel? Yes, by how I behave.

Should I become obsessed with measuring employee feeling through those dreaded culture surveys? No!!!!

…just continue to manage how people feel – by constantly and consistently applying simple philosophies such as the most excellent “Humanity above Bureaucracy” (Buurtzorg).

Leave the constant crappy ‘surveying of the obvious’ to those organisations that (still) don’t get it.

The balanced scorecard was derived because of the major limitations of purely financial measures. However, we should not assume that such a tool is a definitive answer for what we need to manage.

Indeed, it causes damaging behaviours – with management wearing blinkers when focusing on the scorecard “because we’ve tied all our management instruments into it and therefore that’s all that counts round here.”

The highly limited and ‘helicopter view’ scorecard becomes a major part of the ‘wrong management system’ problem.


2. Balance:

This word is used as if we need to balance our focus on the four different quadrants, playing one off against the others as if they are counterbalances to keep in check.

But this isn’t the case. If we did a little bit of, say, learning and growth (e.g. developing our people) and/or customer focus but then said “whoa…steady on, not too much…we need to balance the financials” then we aren’t understanding the nature of the system….and we certainly don’t ‘get’ cause and effect.

cause-and-effect

A metaphor for business to help explain the point:

Let’s suppose that you keep breaking out in a nasty skin rash.

You could pour ice cold water on it, apply a lotion or scratch it…until it bleeds (ouch).

These actions might appear to alleviate the effects…but they are also likely to make things worse…and none of them have considered (let alone dealt with) the cause!

If you continue to ignore the cause and just treat the (currently visible) effects, things could escalate…with new effects presenting…complicating any necessary treatments…causing long lasting or permanent damage…and even death.

If you want to get rid of the rash…and keep it that way (and perhaps even improve your skin complexion and wider health)…then you need to focus your attention on its cause:

  • are you reacting to something you are putting on your skin?
  • what about something you eat, drink or otherwise introduce into your body?
  • maybe it’s something else more complicated?

And once you’ve worked out the likely cause(s) then you need to do something about it.

You work on the cause (such as stop using that brand of sun cream or stop eating shell fish or…stop injecting heroin!!) whilst checking whether it is working by observing the effect (what the likes of Seddon and Johnson would refer to as ‘keeping the score’).

You don’t think “mmm, I’ll balance the cause and the effect”…because you understand the glaringly obvious definitions behind the words ‘cause’ and ‘effect’

Cause: A person or thing that gives rise to an action, phenomenon, or condition

Effect: A change which is a result or consequence of an action or other cause.” (Oxford Dictionary)

Okay, back to that Balanced Scorecard/Strategy map thingy and a cause – effect journey:

  • mgmt-cause-and-effectSenior Management’s beliefs and behaviours determine (i.e. cause) the management system that they choose to put into effect and (often stubbornly) retain;
  • The management system creates (i.e. causes) much of the environment that the people work within (effect);
  • The work environment is the foundation of (i.e. causes) how people act and react whilst doing their jobs (e.g. whether they are engaged, innovative, intrinsically motivated…or not);
  • How people act influences (i.e. causes) how processes are operated and the nature, size and speed of their evolution (whether by continuous or breakthrough improvements);
  • How processes operate and improve creates (i.e. causes) the outcomes that customers experience…and tell other potential customers about (i.e. as advocates or detractors);
  • Customers (whether they buy from, and advocate for us or ignore, avoid and slag us off) determine (i.e. cause) whether we stay in business.

The bl00dy obvious point is that THE FINANCIALS ARE THE EFFECT! So why are we so focused on them, other than to keep the score5.

…or, in a short, snappy sentence: This isn’t something to be BALANCED!!!!!!!!

The ‘balanced’ word keeps people tied to a ‘manage by results’ mentality, rather than managing the causes of the results such that the results then look after themselves.

What winds me up even more than the balanced bit is….wait for it…applying % weightings on the four quadrants5….usually with the financials (yes, the effect) getting the lions share!

That’s like saying “We’ll focus 75% on scratching the rash but only 25% on taking fewer heroin injections”. Aaaargh!!!

Now, you might respond to me by saying you believe that Kaplan and Norton understood the problem with the ‘balanced’ word…which is why they, ahem, ‘refreshed’ their logic with their ‘Strategy Maps’ book.

The problem with this is that they didn’t attack the results thinking, they merely added to it and, as such, many (most?) organisations continue with balancing and weighting…and spectacularly missing the point.


3. Key Performance Indicators vs. Capability:

kpi-statusOkay – let’s suppose that senior management accept that measures aren’t everything and that we shouldn’t be balancing (let alone weighting) things – I hope that we can all agree that some “right measures, measured right” (Inspector Guilfoyle) are going to be very useful…

…and so to the next whopper problem – the “measured right” bit.

Nothing (that I have seen) within the Balanced Scorecard/ Strategy Map logic reflects on, let alone deals with, the hugely important subject of variation and the need to always visualise measures over time.

Management simply use a set of KPIs on a ‘scorecard’ and look at their red down/ green up arrows against last period and/or their traffic lights against budget.

This is to completely ignore the dynamics of a system, and whether such movements are predictable or not….and therefore whether any special attention should be paid to them.

The Balanced Scorecard/Strategy Map approach can therefore create a set of Executives exhibiting the ‘God complex’ (as in “I have the answer!”) whilst being fooled by randomness” (Taleb) – blissfully ignorant of the capability of their value streams (or processes within) and doing much damage by tampering.


and last, but by no means least…

4. Strategy vs. Purpose:

The underlying assumptions within the Balanced Scorecard/Strategy Map thinking would appear to be the conventional ‘shareholder value’ view of the world.

(I’ve previously written a 5-part serialised post on what I think about this….so I won’t repeat this here)

We get fed a feast of:

In short: The core problem (for me) with Kaplan and Norton’s two books is that, not only do they retain the problematic traditional command and control management system, focused on delivering shareholder value – they use it as their foundation to build upon.

It’s therefore no wonder that organisations carry on as before (doing the same crappy stuff), whilst waving their supposedly game-changing ‘Strategy Map’ around a lot.

Have you got hold of that cow? Good…now where’s my ceremonial knife?


To end: ‘having a go’ at me because I’m being so negative

You might shout back “okay you cynic…what would you do instead?!”

Well, I’m not going to be able to answer that in a paragraph – even Kaplan and Norton took two (rather verbose) books…and more than a decade in-between…to present their logic – but I’d suggest that, if you are curious, the 130+ posts on this site would go some way to expressing what I (and I believe my giants) think.

…and if you want to start at measurement then you might want to look here first.

Footnotes:

1. Knowledge based assets: Kaplan and Norton list the following as examples of assets that aren’t measured and managed by financial measures: employee capabilities, databases, information systems, customer relationships, quality, responsive processes, innovative products and services.

2. Measurement system remaining financially based: H. Thomas Johnson’s book ‘Relevance Regained’ makes clear that it wasn’t always so. Financial measures used as operational measures (a bad idea) only came into being from the 1950s onwards. Johnson refers to the period 1950s – 1980s as the ‘Dark Age of Relevance Lost’ and ‘Management by Remote Control’. I would argue that many an organisation hasn’t exited this period.

3. Big consultancies ‘cashing in’: I can (sadly) write this because I have first hand evidence – I was there! 😦

4. Bastardising the Strategy Map includes organisations changing the order of the four elements!!!

5. Financials: There’s a HUGE difference between a) using financial measures to keep the score (which would be good governance) and b) attempting to use them to make operational decisions! Using financials to make operational decisions is to attempt to ‘make the tail wag the dog’.

Yes, accountants should keep the score, for cash flow monitoring and assisting with longer term investment decisions…but accountants should not be attempting ‘remote control management’ of operations.

6. Weighting the elements of the scorecard: See, for example, fig. 9.8 in ‘The Balanced Scorecard’ (1996) and the related commentary.

7. Diversity: I understand that the cow is a holy animal to some. Please don’t be offended by my use of an English phrase in expressing my thinking – no real cows were harmed in the writing of this post…and no harm is intended to those living now, or in the future 🙂

 

Books – Part 2: “There’s a book coming out…”

apples-vs-orangesI have bought and read a fair few ‘management books’ over the years. Some start off usefully but go on to ‘wind me up’, others are absolute diamonds….and so I had a little think about why this might be.

I realised that, whilst obviously hugely important, the quality of the writer’s prose isn’t the fundamental factor – it comes down to the author’s intent.

In an effort to expand and examine my thinking, I tried to ‘put it down on paper’ – I spewed out a ‘compare and contrast’ table.

…and so, in this post I present a short 2-column table breaking management books into two types (of author, and their intent).

These two types – ‘Guru’ and ‘Educator’ – originate from a wonderful Russell Ackoff quote that I shared some time back.

Here goes:

‘Guru’ book: ‘Educator’ book:
Billed as a ‘new’ idea that “changes everything”! Modestly recognises and builds on what’s already been achieved but, importantly, adding much wisdom.
Claimed by the author(s) as (mainly) their own brilliant discovery. Humble recognition of past giants, and their work.
Narrowly drawn – to solve the supposed problem. Wide, and general – offering self-reflection rather than solutions.
A panacea, presented as if some new world order is coming! Caveats and clarifications, usually relating to systems and people.
Presented within a 2 x2 grid (or other such framework) to show that it is all so simple. Recognition that it is complex and multi-dimensional.
The book merely flogs the same material as in the earlier ‘best-selling Harvard Business Review’ (HBR) article (i.e. the same thing, just massively padded out). There isn’t a separate HBR article and book!

The author’s aim isn’t to top the ‘management books’ hit parade.

Gives advice on how to implement their solution – perhaps with a step by step plan and/or a self-assessment checklist. Provides thoughts on further reading, exploration and self-education.
Includes chapters on carefully curated ‘Case Studies’ of organisations that have (apparently) magically transformed themselves. Warts and all consideration of its applicability and usefulness.
Does not seek out or, worse, ignores problematic counters to the idea. Openly explores criticisms and scenarios that don’t appear to fit.
…the narrow idea expands into some management methodology and becomes a cult (complete with consultants offering their ‘thought leadership’ services)…for a few years…

…until the next book comes out!

…requests further work to move ‘our’ combined thinking further.

…the funny (or sad?) thing is that there is usually much that could be of value within the guru’s idea…but their choice of presentation conceals the kernel from its true long term potential…and can do much harm.

Footnotes:

1. I reckon there’s probably a link between the two columns in this post and the three book types in my previous post.

2. Of course the table represents two extreme ends of a spectrum: A given book is likely to tend towards one end…but may not display every ‘quality’ imagined above…blimey – if it DID then it would either be bloody awful or bloody brilliant!

3. A book that, for me, sits in the left hand column (and sits ‘on the surface’ per the last post) is ‘The Balanced Scorecard’…the ink is drying on a post that explains. Watch this space 🙂

Books – Part 1: The typical book store

how-to-read-a-bookHave you ever thought about the types of ‘management books’ out there?

I wrote a post a bit back on three ‘depths of transformation’:

  • ‘On the surface’;
  • ‘Under the skin’; and
  • ‘In the DNA’.

If you walked into the ‘management’ section of a large book shop, examined the selection on offer and then categorised them according to depth of transformation…

…I guess1 that you’d find books in something like the following 100:10:1 ratio:


100 ‘On the surface’ self-help style books filled with loads of methods and tools. The book shop shelves buckle under the weight of these – they are very easily written…by almost anyone! (I’m looking at half a dozen such books on my own shelf right now).

Many (most? …all?) ‘Lean Six Sigma’ books sit here.


10 ‘Under the skin’ books on principles. Much harder to write because they need a very sound basis from which to build…but they don’t really tackle the management system and, importantly, how (and how not) to intervene2.

‘Lean Thinking’ by Womack and Jones is, to me, a classic example.

‘The Goal’ by Goldratt probably sits about here too.


‘In the DNA’ book on management’s thinking and behaviours. This is where the true value resides. These are the gems, where the management system is truly opened up for what it is.

Here’s a random list of (what I consider to be) some3 classic ‘In the DNA’ books4:

– Deming: ‘The New Economics’

– ‘Ackoff’s Best: His classic writings on management’

– Seddon: ‘Freedom from Command and Control’

– Rother: ‘Toyota Kata’; and

– Womack: ‘Gemba Walks’ – a retrospective look at the ‘Lean’ thing in a humble attempt to move from ‘Under the skin’ to ‘In the DNA’.

What ‘In the DNA’ books do you have on your shelf?

Footnotes:

1. Guessing: I realise that I am falling foul of my own criticism – that of expressing an opinion, rather than dealing with facts…and I suppose that I could carry out the exercise in question…but, in this instance, I’m okay with a playful guess 🙂

2. How to intervene: Sure, these book ‘tell you what to do’…but that’s different to making successful interventions!

For the avoidance of doubt, I think that ‘Lean Thinking’ and ‘The Goal’ are both useful books…but (as with most ‘under the skin’ type books) they are so easily abused by management stuck in their ‘command and control’ comfort bubble, mapping what they read onto their current world views (rather than changing them).

3. In the DNA books: I’ve limited my list to a handful. Also, most of the authors I’ve chosen have written more than one book that I see as fitting into this category.

4. Peter Scholtes: I’d note that ‘The Leaders Handbook’ is an interesting mix of all three depths…but most definitely based within the DNA.

Correction, Clarification and Continual Learning

model-t-chassisI wrote a post some months back (July 2016) titled ‘The River Rouge – A divergent legacy’. If you haven’t read it, then it is necessary context for this post.

I received an interesting comment at the end of the post (from a contributor called Andrew) as follows:

You’re perpetuating an inaccurate myth about the Model T and production at Highland Park. The Model T was produced with tremendous variation – far more than a modern car. There were at any given time at least six different body styles of Model T, representing a lot more complexity than a simple color change. http://www.curbsideclassic.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Ford-Model-T-line-up-1911ad-lg.jpg

As to color, the Model T was available in several colors – but not black – in its early days when the production rates were low. Black was introduced, not to minimize variation, but because black paint dried quicker and enabled faster, higher production rates. By 1926, paint science matured to the point that six additional colors were introduced to go along with black (and better compete with Chevrolet).”

I replied to Andrew’s comment and promised that I would add an addendum1…and then, as is usual, life carried on and time flew by. It is now, in this quieter Christmas/ New Year period that I realise that I have a hole to plug.

So here goes…

Correction

My original post, whilst (in my view) highly positive of what Henry Ford achieved, used the enduring “you can have any colour you like, as long as its black” line. I used this as the strap line to observe that “[Ford’s] manufacturing process was not designed to handle variety”, as explained in separate books by H. Thomas Johnson and Mike Rother.

My post then went on to contrast two very different approaches to handling the variety conundrum.

Andrew’s comment pointed out that the Model T was available:

  • in more than one colour; and
  • with different body styles.

He went on to suggest that “The Model T was produced with tremendous variety – far more than a modern car”.

coloursColours: Yes, I can see a number of sources that refer to different colours. However, I would suggest splitting the colour story into three parts (each of which Andrew’s comment eludes to):

The early years (1908 – 1914): From cross-checking a number of Ford related websites, it would appear that the Model T was available in a small variety of colours during its early low-level production years (grey, green, blue and red).


The volume years (1914 – 1926): This period corresponds to breakthrough improvements in producing at scale (and reducing the price)….and the only colour available was black.

In his 1922 ‘My Life and Works’ autobiography Ford refers to his salesmen wanting to cater for their customers’ every whim, rather than explaining that the product already satisfies their requirements…and it was this exchange that caused his “so long as its black” idiom:

“Therefore in 1909 I announced one morning, without any previous warning, that in the future we were going to build only one model, that the model was going to be “Model T”, and that the chassis would be exactly the same for all cars, and I remarked: “Any customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black.”

Reference is made across a number of sources that black paint was used because its fast-drying properties aided speedy production. Other reasons suggested are the cheap cost of black paint, its durability and ease of reapplication (e.g. when repairing).


The end (1926 – 27): Colour choices were reintroduced…but this can be seen as an attempt to prop sales up and fight off the inevitable death of the Model T:

“Alfred Sloan [General Motors] began to offer inexpensive Chevrolets with amenities that the Model T lacked…..the market began to shift…styling and excitement suddenly counted to the customer.

 But Henry Ford refused even to consider replacing his beloved Model T…only one person persisted in warning him of the impending crisis: his son, Edsel…it was the first of many arguments that Edsel would lose.

 The Chevrolet continued to take sales from the dour Model T. By 1926, T sales had plummeted, and the realities of the market place finally convinced Henry that the end was at hand. On May 25th 1927, Ford abruptly announced the end of production for the Model T.” (Forbes Greatest Business Stories of All Time)

Body styles: Andrew’s comment usefully provides a link to an image showing a number of different Model T body styles, though I note that the title refers to 1911 which sits within the ‘early years’ pre-mass production period.

Breaking the body styles comment into a few parts:


The chassis: The Model T Ford was made up of the chassis (see title picture of this post) and then a body connected on to it.

From what I have read (including Ford’s words), the key point about the Model T Ford was that the chassis ‘moving down the line’ were all the same. Sure, they would differ over time as the design was (regularly) improved, but not ‘in the line’.

I find the picture below quite interesting – it shows2 a long line of Model T chassis waiting for a body (of differing styles) to be lowered on to it from a side process. Note the overhead rail coming in from the right.

model-t-production-line


Factory Bodies: Yes, I can see that different bodies were available – as can be made out from examining the above picture – but there was a limited range of standard designs (e.g. the Tourer, Roadster, Coupe and Sedan3).

You might ask “but what about all those other body styles out there?”


Aftermarket ‘engineering’: You can come across all sorts of weird and wacky looking vehicles all around the world that have been built on a Model T chassis. This is unsurprising given the sheer volume (and market share) of Model T’s that were out there.

A fair bit of ‘reconfiguring’ occurred, with owners hacking the car apart and customising it for their own needs. Many specialist aftermarket companies sprang up to perform conversions, even maturing to selling prefabricated kits for specific purposes, such as tractors. If you want a laugh at the sorts of conversions carried out then have a look at some of the images here (including a tank, a camper van…and a church!).

So, yes, I do need to correct my previous post’s implication that you could only ever buy a black Model T, and that one Model T was exactly the same as any other.

There was some variety, but does that mean Henry Ford had built a manufacturing process specifically aimed at handling this? And so I move on to….

 Clarification

clarificationGetting back to the point within my original ‘River Rouge’ post – that of handling variety in the line:

Andrew’s comment of The Model T was produced with tremendous variety…” might imply that Ford had indeed solved the variety riddle. I don’t think that this is the case and I’ll use a couple of passages from Ford’s own 1926 ‘Today and Tomorrow’ book to illuminate why I believe this:

“Whenever one can line up machinery for the making of exactly one thing and study everything to the end of making only that thing, then the savings which come about are startling.” (Chapter 5)

“The strongest objection to large numbers of styles and designs is that they are incompatible with economical production by any one concern. But when concerns specialize, each on its own design, economy and variety are both attainable. And both are necessary…

…we believe that no factory is large enough to make two kinds of products. Our organisation is not large enough to make two kinds of motor cars under the same roof.” (Chapter 7)

An underlying philosophy of Ford’s tremendous production success was a standard product (i.e. the opposite of variety)…which nearly became his undoing and set his organisation onto a path of catch-up with General Motors from the late 1920s onwards.

…none of this takes away from what Ford achieved and what then happened in American manufacturing and, in contrast, across the world in Japan. To summarise:

  • Henry Ford made amazing advances in respect of manufacturing, but the Model T’s homogeneity became its Achilles heel (a fact that he eventually conceded to his son Edsel and to his competitors);
  • In general, American manufacturing from the 1950s onwards went in the direction of scale and ‘unlearned’ much of what Ford had shown them; whilst
  • Toyota (learning from Ford) carried on in the direction of flow and worked out methods of handling variety in the line…thus achieving great things.

It’s worth reflecting that Taiichi Ohno credits Henry Ford with Toyota’s foundations:

“Taiichi Ohno…always spoke glowingly of Ford’s achievements…In 1982, Philip Caldwell, then head of Ford Motor Company, visited Japan. When Caldwell asked Eiji Toyoda, head of Toyota Motors, where Toyota had learned the production methods they employed so successfully in the 1970’s, Toyoda replied, ‘there’s no secret to how we learned to do what we do, Mr Caldwell. We learned it at the Rouge.’” (Johnson, quoting from David Halberstam’s ‘The Reckoning’)

Continual Learning

continual-learning-treeAndrew’s comment on my original post provided me with the impetus to learn some more.

  • I entered into a useful dialogue with Tom Johnson and Mike Rother;
  • I bought and read Ford’s book ‘Today and Tomorrow’;
  • I read around (and cross-checked) a fair bit of internet content; and
  • …I pondered what all of that lot meant.

I reflect on a wonderful Ackoff quote:

Although being taught is an obstruction to learning, teaching is a marvellous way to learn!”

i.e. it is in the act of attempting to explain something to others (e.g. via a post) that we can truly learn.

(I believe that) I now know more…but I’m even more certain that there’s much more to learn. A never-ending journey 🙂

Footnotes

1. Writing an Addendum: I am mindful that a number of you may have read my original post but not seen Andrew’s comment or my reply. So, rather than allowing this to remain somewhat hidden, I thought it only right (and respectful of Andrew’s fair and useful comment) to elevate my response* to a further post.

(* I am not a fan of the ‘gutter press’ splashing scandalous statements across their front pages, only to publish a unapologetic, one-line ‘retraction’ in tiny text somewhere buried on page 13)

2. Using photos: I am mindful that Ford’s production processes changed all the time and I have been warned to be careful when using a black and white picture of Model T production methods – such a picture shows how it worked at a point in time…and could easily have changed radically very soon afterwards!

3. Body Styles information taken from http://www.fordmodelt.net/model-t-ford.htm. It shows that each of the main body styles evolved over time e.g. the Touring car went from 2 doors from 1909, to 3 doors from 1912 and then 4 doors from 1926.

…and I just have to add a picture of (what I understand to be) a Model T chassis with a body style of a house – definitely ‘after market’:

model-t-motor-home

A recent addition: An index!

Alphabetized organizing filing system, close-up. Shot in studio with Phase One.

So it’s been a little over two years since I started this blog and I’ve now published well over 100 posts. So many that I forget what I’ve actually written about!

If I’m looking for something particular in my, ahem, ‘back catalogue’ (which is often the case), then how do I go about finding it?

Well, by a few routes:

  • I have tried to add links in each new post to relevant past posts…but this has become harder to achieve;

and if you scroll down the right hand side of the blog you will find:

  • a search box…but you kind of need to know the name of what you are looking for (easier for me…but ‘mind games’ for you);
  • the ‘tag cloud’…but, whilst this is good, it doesn’t show everything; and
  • an archive list (by month published)…but this is to play a game of chronological ‘pot luck’.

You can see then that there’s a few ways to attempt to find things…but none of them are very good, let alone complete!

Therefore, in the spirit of improvement, I have added an index, structured around two key models:

  • Study: “how the work works” (Seddon’s Check model); and
  • Intervention: “how to change it” (Deming’s Theory of Profound Knowledge).

Each of these models is then broken down into categories within.

If you are interested in exploring around the complete set of posts published to date (whether in general, or for something in particular) then I hope you find it of use 🙂

Example: If you want to focus on, say ‘measurement’ then you can go to the set of posts that deal with this area

I’ve even tried to be clever and (through the help of WordPress help forums1 🙂 ) created model diagrams with selectable (i.e. ‘clickable’) regions within – as a self confessed technophobe I’ve surprised myself!…but of course it might not work for you!(?)

You will find the index in the top right of the blog:

index

…have an explore, ‘click around’ and see what you make of it.

So…going forward:

Every time I publish a post I will add it to the relevant region of the index.

Feedback on how this index works out for you will be much appreciated…and any other suggestions for improvements are most welcome.

Bonus…

Oh yes…and just in case you hadn’t noticed, I’ve recently added two very worthy giants to my list: Jay Forrester and Donella Meadows.

Merry Christmas/ Happy New Year/ Good wishes whatever your particular (non)‘theist’ or ‘calendar’ variety is.

Footnote

1. I used the following site to create the code for mapping regions of each model (as suggested to me by Timethief ):      http://www.isdntek.com/tagbot/imap.htm

 

 

Why I dislike…

maturity-model…(so called) ‘maturity models’.

You know the ones I mean:

They are drawn up with an answer already in mind…and there’s seemingly one ‘out there’ for every ‘silver bullet.’

They are broken into:

  • a supposed linear 1 to 5 scale; and
  • neat horizontal swim lanes of supposedly important sub-categories.

The wording to articulate each point on the scale is contrived to work for the author’s intent. They start off as ‘black’ on the left (obviously undesirable), finish as ‘white’ on the right (i.e. heavenly) and go through a torturous swamp of grey in-between.

The people involved in designing and then scoring ‘our position on’ the scale are ‘in management’ (often assisted by some external consultants)…with little or no (meaningful) inclusion of the front line or customers i.e. those that would actually know about reality.

Scoring is performed based on opinions (perhaps in workshops, or via surveys), not the facts at the gemba.

Each team employing such a maturity scale is miraculously1 led to self-score themselves somewhere between a 1 and 2 at the start.

Management then use this ‘shocking’ score to justify the investment in a transformation programme (often given a name that is dripping in propaganda). Such a programme contains a wondrous set of initiatives to move2 the organisation from a ‘1.5’ score, up to a target3 score of ‘5′.

…and finally, each organisation stops once they reach a (self declared) ‘4’, saying that this is how far they need to go – a 5 now being seen as somehow no longer important. They stop because everyone’s got bored of it and/or they’ve used up their budget…and want to move onto another shiny new thing.

BUT…and this is the biggie…before, during and after this maturity exercise, they retain, and promote, management’s current faulty logic on ‘implementing change’.

An observation: A fundamental fault with the ‘maturity model movement’ is that each model has an end point (the supposed end of the journey). If this were so then the likes of Toyota would presumably have stopped improving decades ago.

A reflection:  I was asked by a comrade as to whether I believed that ‘maturity models’ could be of use4.

So, er, yes…there could most definitely be some positives BUT I’d suggest that these will be limited in scope, scale and duration….so not really transformational.

Now, if you think that you’ve got a maturity framework that would change management’s fundamental beliefs and behaviours…then you are very welcome to share this with me and anyone else reading this blog.

 A closing ‘cover my arse’ comment: I ‘get’ that many of you reading this will have ‘successfully’ used maturity models in your careers to date. This post is just me jotting down my thoughts on why I have a problem with them. It’s merely therapy for me 🙂

Footnotes

1. Not so miraculous when you consider that the people wanting the organisation to implement ‘the change’ wrote (or copied) the scale and its associated wording. It would be no good if you were already a 4 or 5.

2. When I say ‘move’ I actually mean ‘look for any evidence’ that could justify arguing that you are now a rather wonderful 4!

3. regarding ‘target’ – management will likely have baked some success criteria into their existing (and hugely flawed) cascaded objectives and incentives framework…meaning that they are somewhat biased in looking for favourable outcomes.

4. A few of those around me are always trying to get me to ‘see the positives’ in things 🙂